State Supreme Courts Resource

4 Democrats, 3 Republicans

• CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 17. Cruel or unusual punishment may not be inflicted or excessive fines imposed.
• Note that California’s state constitutional analogue to the Eighth Amendment uses “or” instead of “and.” The California courts have explained that this “distinction in wording is purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic. As a result, we construe the state constitutional provision separately from its counterpart in the federal Constitution.” People v. Baker, 20 Cal. App. 5th 711, 723, 229 Cal. Rptr. 3d 431, 442 (2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

• Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(West). Allows private right of action and action by Attorney general, district attorney, or city attorney for civil rights violations.
  • Individual cause of action: (c) Any individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, has been interfered with, or attempted to be interfered with . . . may institute and prosecute in his or her own name and on his or her own behalf a civil action for damages, including, but not limited to, damages under Section 52, injunctive relief, and other appropriate equitable relief to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured, including appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate a pattern or practice of conduct as described in subdivision (a).
  • Action brought by Attorney general, district attorney, or city attorney: (b) If a person or persons, whether or not acting under color of law, interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state, the Attorney General, or any district attorney or city attorney may bring a civil action for injunctive and other appropriate equitable relief in the name of the people of the State of California, in order to protect the peaceable exercise or enjoyment of the right or rights secured. An action brought by the Attorney General, any district attorney, or any city attorney may also seek a civil penalty of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000). If this civil penalty is requested, it shall be assessed individually against each person who is determined to have violated this section and the penalty shall be awarded to each individual whose rights under this section are determined to have been violated.
  • Jurisdiction: (d) An action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b) may be filed either in the superior court for the county in which the conduct complained of occurred or in the superior court for the county in which a person whose conduct complained of resides or has his or her place of business. An action brought by the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (a) also may be filed in the superior court for any county wherein the Attorney General has an office, and in that case, the jurisdiction of the court shall extend throughout the state.
• There is also an implied cause of action for violations of the state constitution.
  • Giraldo v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371 (2008) (holding “no basis to recognize a claim for damages under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution [(cruel and unusual clause)], but noting that “even in the absence of a private right of action for damages, an individual may maintain an action for equitable relief for ongoing violations of the Constitution.”).
  • Katzberg v. Regents of Univ. of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002) (reaffirming that many California constitutional provisions support an action for declaratory relief or an injunction, and laying out framework for the (more limited) availability of a damages action to remedy a constitutional violation).
    • Id. at 307: “It is clear that the due process clause of article I, section 7(a) is self-executing, and that even without any effectuating legislation, all branches of government are required to comply with its terms. Furthermore, it also is clear that, like many other constitutional provisions, this section supports an action, brought by a private plaintiff against a proper defendant, for declaratory relief or for injunction.”
    • Id. at 317: “As we shall explain, we conclude it is appropriate to employ the following framework for determining the existence of a damages action to remedy an asserted constitutional violation. First, we shall inquire whether there is evidence from which we may find or infer, within the constitutional provision at issue, an affirmative intent either to authorize or to withhold a damages action to remedy a violation. In undertaking this inquiry we shall consider the language and history of the constitutional provision at issue, including whether it contains guidelines, mechanisms, or procedures implying a monetary remedy, as well as any pertinent common law history. If we find any such intent, we shall give it effect. Second, if no affirmative intent either to authorize or to withhold a damages remedy is found, we shall undertake the “constitutional tort” analysis adopted by Bivens and its progeny. Among the relevant factors in this analysis are whether an adequate remedy exists, the extent to which a constitutional tort action would change established tort law, and the nature and significance of the constitutional provision. If we find that these factors militate against recognizing the constitutional tort, our inquiry ends. If, however, we find that these factors favor recognizing a constitutional tort, we also shall consider the existence of any special factors counseling hesitation in recognizing a damages action, including deference to legislative judgment, avoidance of adverse policy consequences, considerations of government fiscal policy, practical issues of proof, and the competence of courts to assess particular types of damages.”

• Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.6 (West). Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.
• Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.4 (West). A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a tortious act or omission of an independent contractor of the public entity to the same extent that the public entity would be subject to such liability if it were a private person. Nothing in this section subjects a public entity to liability for the act or omission of an independent contractor if the public entity would not have been liable for the injury had the act or omission been that of an employee of the public entity.

• Juveniles: California Code, Welfare and Institutions Code, WIC § 208. Defines “room confinement” as the placement of a youth (anyone under the age of 18) in a sleeping room or cell alone with minimal contact staff. Youths can generally only be subjected to room confinement for up to four hours. Before resorting to room confinement, all less restrictive options must be exhausted. Room confinement is completely prohibited if that it would compromise a youth’s mental and physical health.

• None
• Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391 (West). (b) “Vexatious litigant” means a person who does any of the following: (1) In the immediately preceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigations other than in a small claims court that have been (i) finally determined adversely to the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pending at least two years without having been brought to trial or hearing.
• Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.7 (West). (a) In addition to any other relief provided in this title, the court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter a prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant from filing any new litigation in the courts of this state in propria persona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justice or presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposed to be filed. Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigant may be punished as a contempt of court.
• Cal. Penal Code § 2932.5: A prisoner who is found by a trial court to be a vexatious litigant as defined by Section 391 of the Code of Civil Procedure , shall be denied or lose 30 days of work time credit awarded under Section 2933.

• Torts: Cal. Gov’t Code § 815 (West). Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person. (b) The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with Section 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute, including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the public entity if it were a private person.
• Discretionary Acts: Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.2 (West). Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.
• Parole or release of prisoner; escape of prisoners; persons resisting arrest: Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.8 (West). Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: (a) Any injury resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner or from determining the terms and conditions of his parole or release or from determining whether to revoke his parole or release. (b) Any injury caused by: (1) An escaping or escaped prisoner; (2) An escaping or escaped arrested person; or (3) A person resisting arrest.
• Medical Care: Cal/ Gov’t Code § 845.6 (West). Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his custody; but, except as otherwise provided by Sections 855.8 and 856, a public employee, and the public entity where the employee is acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical care. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee who is lawfully engaged in the practice of one of the healing arts under any law of this state from liability for injury proximately caused by malpractice or exonerates the public entity from its obligation to pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement that it is required to pay under subdivision (d) of Section 844.6.