State Supreme Courts Resource

6 Democrats, 1 Republican

• Technically no cruel and unusual punishments clause, but due process provisions have been interpreted to prohibit cruel and unusual punishments.
• However, “[i]t is by now well established that the constitution of Connecticut prohibits cruel and unusual punishments under the auspices of the dual due process provisions contained in article first, §§ 8 and 9.12 Those due process protections take as their hallmark principles of fundamental fairness rooted in our state’s unique common law, statutory, and constitutional traditions. Although neither provision of the state constitution expressly references cruel or unusual punishments, it is settled constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.” State v. Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 16–17, 122 A.3d 1, 14 (2015) (internal citations omitted). The court considered “(1) persuasive relevant federal precedents; (2) historical insights into the intent of our constitutional forebears; (3) the operative constitutional text; (4) related Connecticut precedents; (5) persuasive precedents of other states; and (6) contemporary understandings of applicable economic and sociological norms, or, as otherwise described, relevant public policies.” Id. at 18.
• When arguing that state constitution should afford more protection, rely on “Geisler Factors.” State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992), abrogated by State v. Brocuglio, 264 Conn. 778, 826 A.2d 145 (2003)

• Conn. General Statutes § 31-51q. Creates a state cause of action for damages to protect employees from retaliatory action based on the exercise of their First Amendment rights and enumerated state constitutional rights.

• There is an implied cause of action for some violations of the state constitution.
  • Binette v. Sabo, 710 A.2d 688 (1998) (recognizing implied cause of action for violations of unreasonable search and seizure and personal liberty provisions in state constitution).
• Bur there is no implied right of action for damages for violations of the state constitution where the legislature has provided adequate alternative remedies.
  • Kelley Prop. Dev., Inc. v. Town of Lebanon, 226 Conn. 314, 339 (1993).
• Connecticut recently created a statutory cause of action for violations of the state constitution by police officers, with immunity where officer held an “objectively good faith belief” that conduct did not violate the law. Conn. Pub. Act. No. 20-1 §41 (2020 eff. July, 2021). Attorneys’ fees may be awarded if the conduct was deliberate or reckless, and indemnification will be denied if officer acted with malice. Id.

• Connecticut SB 1109 An Act Concerning Solitary Confinement, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2019). Status: Gov. Ned Lamont vetoed it in June 2021, instead issuing an executive order limiting the practice. Summary: Would have prohibited the Department of Corrections from holding “any person on administrative segregation status or restrictive housing status.” “Administrative segregation status” was defined as “the Department of Correction’s practice of placing an inmate on restrictive housing status following a determination that such inmate can no longer be safely managed within the general inmate population of the correctional facility.” “Restrictive housing status” was defined as “the designation of an inmate by the Department of Correction that provides for closely regulated management and separation of such inmate from other inmates.”

• CT ST § 4-165. State officer will be liable for wanton, reckless or malicious acts within scope of employment.
• CT ST § 7-465. Town, city or borough obligated to pay for damages for employee’s infringement of any person’s civil rights or for physical damages if the employee was acting in the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, and if damage was not the result of any wilful or wanton act.
• CT ST § 52-557n. A political subdivision of the state shall be liable for damages to person or property caused by the negligent acts or omissions of such political subdivision or any employee, officer or agent thereof acting within the scope of his employment or official duties.