State Supreme Courts Resource

4 Democrats, 3 Republicans

• N.C. CONST. art. I, § 27. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted.
• ARTICLE XI: Section 1: Punishments. The following punishments only shall be known to the laws of this State: death, imprisonment, fines, suspension of a jail or prison term with or without conditions, restitution, community service, restraints on liberty, work programs, removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under this State. Section 2: Death Punishment. The object of punishments being not only to satisfy justice, but also to reform the offender and thus prevent crime, murder, arson, burglary, and rape, and these only, may be punishable with death, if the General Assembly shall so enact. Section 3: Charitable and Correctional Institutions and Agencies. Such charitable, benevolent, penal, and correctional institutions and agencies as the needs of humanity and the public good may require shall be established and operated by the State under such organization and in such manner as the General Assembly may prescribe. Section 4: Welfare Policy; Board of Public Welfare. Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and a Christian state. Therefore the General Assembly shall provide for and define the duties of a board of public welfare.

• Midgett v. North Carolina State Highway Commission, 132 S.E.2d 599 (N.C. 1963), overruled on other grounds by Lea Co. v. North Carolina Board of Transportation, 304 S.E.2d 164, 174 (N.C 1983) (“[W]here the Constitution points out no remedy and no statute affords an adequate remedy under a particular fact situation, the common law will furnish the appropriate action for adequate redress of such grievance.”)
• Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (N.C. 2009) (recognizing cause of action for violation of right to education).
• Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 413 S.E.2d 276 (N.C. 1992) (recognizing cause of action for violation of right to free speech).
• Sale v. State Highway & Pub. Works Com., 89 S.E.2d 290 (N.C. 1955) (recognizing a cause of action under the state due process clause).
• Privette v. University of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 96 N.C. App. 124, 385 S.E.2d 185 (1989) (state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 actions).

• Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. § 143-291, et seq. Specifies that if a government officer, employee, or agent is acting “within the scope of their duties” and negligently causes harm, the person who was injured may bring a claim against the government. The Act does not cover cases in which a government employee intentionally caused harm.

• N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-110(b) (providing for dismissal of “frivolous suits” brought by indigent or pro se incarcerated people); 148-118.1-.8 (2002): 118.1 (providing for an APA like structure of prison regulations); 118.2(b)(requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit).

• “It is a fundamental rule of law that the State is immune from suit unless it expressly consents to be sued.” Zimmer v. North Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 87 N.C. App. 132, 134, 360 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1987) (citation omitted).
• “By enactment of the Tort Claims Act, N.C.G.S. § 143-291, et seq., the General Assembly partially waived the sovereign immunity of the State to the extent that it consented that the State could be sued for injuries proximately caused by the negligence of a State employee acting within the scope of his employment.” Brown v. N. Carolina Dept. of Pub. Safety, 819 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. App. 2018).
• Qualified immunity for implied causes of action for state constitutional violations is an open question. Matthew R. Gauthier, Kicking and Screaming: Dragging North Carolina’s Direct Constitutional Claims into the Twenty- First Century, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 1735, 1747-48 (2017).